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Abstract
We propose a mathematical model of ‘approximate’ interpersonal compar-
isons of well-being, in terms of an incomplete preorder over a space of ‘psy-
chophysical states’. We argue that this model is consistent with people’s intu-
itions about interpersonal comparisons, intertemporal preferences, and changes
in psychological identity over time. We then construct several simple mathe-
matical models to illustrate the versatility of this approach.
The philosophical and practical problems surrounding interpersonal comparisons
of well-being are well known.1 Much of the modern theory of social evaluation de-
pends on some precise form of interpersonal comparability.2 But since the critique of
Robbins (1935, 1938), ‘ordinalists’ have argued that such interpersonal comparisons
are empirically impossible, or even meaningless.3
Sen (1970a, 1972 and Ch.7* of 1970b) proposed a compromise between these ex-
tremes; while acknowledging that ‘precise’ interpersonal comparisons of well-being
might be impossible, he argued that certain ‘approximate’ interpersonal comparisons
∗I am grateful to O¨zgu¨r Evren, Klaus Nehring, Efe Ok, and Clemens Puppe for their helpful
comments on early drafts of this paper. I am especially grateful to Marc Fleurbaey, Franz Dietrich,
and two anonymous referees for their many detailed and valuable comments. None of these people
are responsible for any errors or deficiencies which remain. The final work on this paper was done
while visiting the Universite´ de Montre´al Department of Economics; I thank the UdeM and CIREQ
for their hospitality. This research was also supported by NSERC grant #262620-2008.
1See e.g. Little (1957, Ch.4), Jeffrey (1971), Waldner (1972, 1974), Sen (1979), Griffin (1986, Ch.
VII), Davidson (1986), Gibbard (1986), Barrett and Hausman (1990), Weintraub (1998), Hausman
and McPherson (2006; §7.2), and especially Elster and Roemer (1991) and Fleurbaey and Hammond
(2004).
2See e.g. d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002).
3Robbins argued that interpersonal comparisons were ‘purely normative’ and had no ‘scientific
content’. But he still acknowledged that such normative analysis had an important role in economics
(Robbins, 1981).
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were often manifestly obvious, and thus, should be recognized by any reasonable eth-
ical theory.4 (Sen asked rhetorically: When Rome burned, did Nero’s welfare gain
outweigh the welfare loss of all the other Romans, or not?) Sen modeled this intu-
ition by considering a weighted utilitarian social welfare function, where the weight
vector is an unknown element of a convex cone. The result is a partial ordering on
the space of utility vectors, which is not complete like the utilitarian social welfare
order, but is more complete than the Pareto order. Sen’s approach was later elab-
orated by Fine (1975), Blackorby (1975), and Basu (1980, Ch.6), and critiqued by
Bezembinder and Van Acker (1987). A similar model of ‘convex cone utilitarianism’
was advanced by Baucells and Shapley (2006, 2008). Recently, Pivato (2010a,b,c)
has studied the aggregation of both ordinal preferences and vNM preferences with
‘approximate’ interpersonal comparisons.
These papers all assume that some system of ‘approximate interpersonal compar-
isons’ is given, and focus on the social aggregation problem. The present paper is
complementary: it proposes a formal, yet intuitively plausible model of approximate
interpersonal comparisons of well-being. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1
first discusses various conflicting conceptions of this ‘well-being’ which we are supposed
to be comparing. It then presents intuitive arguments for the possibility of approxi-
mate interpersonal comparisons, and introduces two other, closely related problems:
the possibility of intertemporal comparisons when people’s psychological identities
change over time, and the existence of ‘metapreferences’. To describe these phenom-
ena, a person must be described both by a ‘physical state’ (representing, e.g. health
and wealth) and a ‘psychological state’ (representing, e.g. beliefs, desires, emotions).
Both physical and psychological states are variable, and ‘well-being’ depends on both.
Section 1 concludes with the formal model of approximate interpersonal comparisons
of well-being in terms of this ‘psychophysical’ state space.
Unlike the models of Sen (1970a,b, 1972) and Baucells and Shapley (2006, 2008),
this model is defined using a preference order, not cardinal utility functions. Sections
2 and 3 link the model with such utility representations. First, Section 2 develops a
special case of the model which represents ‘approximate interpersonal comparisons of
utility’. Next, Section 3 discusses ‘multiutility representations’ for the interpersonal
comparison system.
Section 4 provides notation and terminology for sections 5-8. Section 5 shows that
one ‘obvious’ strategy for approximate interpersonal comparisons (based on multi-
ple desiderata) fails. Section 6 constructs interpersonal comparisons using people’s
subjective feelings of envy or pity for one another. Section 7 supposes that each per-
son can make accurate interpersonal comparisons at least in some ‘neighbourhood’ of
her own psychological type, and shows how to construct a global system of interper-
sonal comparisons by ‘gluing together’ these ‘local’ interpersonal comparison systems
(subject to some consistency conditions). This generalizes an idea of Ortun˜o-Ortin
and Roemer (1991). Section 8 performs a similar construction, but under a weaker
assumption that people’s subjective interpersonal comparisons are only accurate in
4He also alluded to this idea in (Sen, 1977, footnotes 4, 21 and 31), (Sen, 1979, §4), (Sen, 1985a,
p.179), (Sen, 1999, pp.356 and 359), and (Sen, 2009, pp.277-278).
2
some ‘infinitesimal’ neighbourhood around their current psychological type.
1 Towards a model of approximate interpersonal comparisons
Interpersonal comparisons of what? The issue of interpersonal welfare comparisons is
complicated by disagreement over the precise meaning of ‘welfare’. For classical hedo-
nists like Bentham, ‘welfare’ was simply instantaneous subjective pleasure or happiness
(aggregated over time if necessary). But instead of instantaneous happiness, we might
define ‘welfare’ as long-term ‘satisfaction with life’ (e.g. as reported on ‘happiness
surveys’).5 However, happiness and satisfaction both suffer from adaptation effects
(‘hedonic treadmill’) and one’s social comparison group (e.g. envy), and are partly
determined by personal tastes and aspirations, which arguably should not influence
social choice. Thus, we might insist on some more ‘objective’ measure of welfare;
we might, for example, judge a ‘happy slave’ to have lower welfare than a spoiled
and self-pitying millionaire with ‘expensive tastes’ (even if the slave subjectively feels
happier).
Alternately, we might eschew any mention of ‘welfare’, and instead base our ethical
analysis on the preferences of the individuals —either their explicitly declared prefer-
ences, or those implicitly ‘revealed’ through their choice behaviour, or their ‘omniscient
preferences’ (those the individuals would have if they were perfectly informed, perfectly
rational, and had infinite intelligence),6 or their ‘laundered preferences’ (which disre-
gard ethically repugnant preferences such as sadism or masochism, and overrule the
desires of ‘happy slaves’ or suicidally depressed individuals).
Anti-welfarism. In fact, the whole issue of interpersonal welfare comparisons may be
moot. Many ethical theories altogether reject ‘welfarism’ —the idea that social choices
should be determined by preference or utility data7 —and instead argue that social
evaluation should be based on some richer, more nuanced, more concrete, and generally
multidimensional conception of ‘quality of life’, such as Rawls’ (1971) ‘primary goods’,
Sen’s (1985, 1988) ‘functionings and capabilities’, Cohen’s (1989) ‘advantage’ or (1993)
‘midfare’,8 or the ‘quality-adjusted life-years’ of healthcare economics (Tsuchiya and
Miyamoto, 2009). Closely related is the theory of ‘fair allocation’ of resources and
costs (Moulin, 2003; Thomson, 2005, 2008), which avoids any reference to interper-
5As emphasized by Diener (1991) or Diener et al. (1999), ‘life-satisfaction’ is not the same as
instantaneous happiness.
6If we assume people are motivated only by the pursuit of happiness/pleasure, then the omniscient
preference approach is tantamount to the classical hedonistic approach. However, this motivational
assumption is dubious, and ‘omniscience’ itself is even more dubious.
7In fact, Dietrich (2006) has distinguished three possibilities: ‘welfarism’ (social choice driven by
individuals’ hedonic or welfare data), ‘preferencism’ (social choice driven by individuals’ preference
data), and ‘judgementism’ (social choice driven by individuals’ subjective judgements of the ‘justness’
of social alternatives). However, most uses of ‘welfarism’ in the literature do not seem to differentiate
between these three possibilities.
8Roemer (1996) provides an excellent summary, comparison, and criticism of Rawls’, Sen’s and
Cohen’s theories, among others, and also presents his own approach.
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sonal welfare comparisons by formulating all ethical principles in terms of tangible,
quantifiable, exchangeable goods and bads, which admit canonical allocations (e.g.
equal division, Walrasian equilibrium) and straightforward interpersonal comparison
rules (e.g. no-envy).
These concrete, multi-criterion approaches generally require a fairly rich informa-
tional setting (where social alternatives map to ‘bundles’ of resources, capabilities,
etc.) to be applicable; they cannot be applied to an ‘abstract’ social choice problem.
If a multi-criterion approach is based entirely on tangible or objective measures of
personal well-being (e.g. purchasing power, education level, lifespan, etc.), then inter-
personal comparisons are readily made. However, if some of the criteria are intangibles
which do not lend themselves to an obvious objective measure (e.g. autonomy, secu-
rity, dignity, liberty, self-actualization, quality of social relationships, participation in
community life, etc.), then a problem of interpersonal comparison can still arise.
Furthermore, as observed by Arrow (1973), a multicriterion approach to well-being
trades the problem of interpersonal comparisons for another, equally thorny problem.
To obtain unambiguous solutions to the decision problems faced by an agent (either
an individual or society), the agent must have a complete preference order over the
set of alternatives. But ‘quality of life’ is comprised of many factors: mental and
physical health, wealth and economic opportunity, political and personal freedom,
social prestige, quality of personal relationships, etc. —and each of these factors must
be split into several subfactors to be properly quantified. To get a complete order, it
seems we must combine all of these variables into a single numerical ‘index’, which
purports to measure ‘overall quality of life’. What is the correct way to define this
index? Why are we justified in employing the same index for two people with wildly
different preferences and life-goals? Any attempt to answer these questions rapidly
becomes embroiled in philosophical issues which are dangerously close to the questions
of interpersonal comparisons we were trying to escape in the first place.9
However, as argued by Williams (1973), Levi (1986), and Sen,10 it may not be
possible, necessary, or even appropriate to insist on a complete order. The plural-
ity of factors influencing individual welfare, and the plurality of (often conflicting)
preferences, values, and conceptions of justice found in a diverse society may make
some degree of incompleteness inevitable. The model in this paper is precisely such
an incomplete order. The model is not committed to any particular conception of
‘well-being’, and is compatible with any of the preferencist, welfarist, or non-welfarist
conceptions discussed above. For concreteness and simplicity, I will sometimes speak
in terms of ‘preferences’ or ‘welfare’, but this does not imply any commitment to
preferencism or welfarism.
A question of precision. In reality, it does seem possible to make at least crude
9However, Fleurbaey (2007) has proposed an interesting solution to this ‘indexing dilemma’ using
the theory of fair allocations.
10See Sen (1970b, Ch.7*; 1985b, #1, §V, pp.177-181 and #2, §V; 1997, §5; 2004, §7), and most
recently, (2009, pp.103, 135 and 144). Sen has also (1973, Ch.3) investigated incomplete rankings in
the context of inequality measurement. From the opposite direction, Stecher (2008) has shown how
to derive an incomplete social preference relation starting from an arbitrary social choice rule.
4
interpersonal comparisons of well-being. For example, if Zara and her family and
friends are physically comfortable, healthy, and safe, while Juan and his family and
friends are suffering in a concentration camp or dying of hemorrhagic fever, it seems
fairly uncontroversial to assert that Zara’s welfare is higher than Juan’s (according to
any notion of welfare). Likewise, if Zara scores much higher than Juan in every item
on a comprehensive list of measures of health, well-being, and quality of life, then
again it seems plausible that Zara’s welfare is higher than Juan’s.
Of course, if Zara, Juan and their families are in roughly equal physical circum-
stances, and they both have roughly equal scores on all measures of well-being, then it
is difficult to say who is happier; such ‘high-precision’ interpersonal comparisons might
not be possible. However, the social welfare models of Sen (1970a,b), Baucells and
Shapley (2006, 2008), and Pivato (2010a,b,c) show that even crude, ‘low-precision’ in-
terpersonal comparisons can be leveraged to define social preference relations which are
far more complete than the Pareto ordering. Furthermore, only such low-precision in-
terpersonal comparisons are required to decide many public policy issues; e.g. whether
to transfer wealth from the fabulously rich to the abject poor; whether to spend public
resources on emergency medical care or disaster relief; whether to quarantine a few
people to protect millions from a deadly plague, etc.
Changing minds. Interpersonal comparisons are also necessary when the psycholo-
gies of the agents are themselves variables which can be modified by policy. Most
social choice models assume a fixed population of agents with fixed preferences over
the set of possible states of the (physical) world; the social evaluation is somehow
determined by these preferences. Each agent’s preferences presumably arise from her
‘psychology’, which is assumed to be exogenous and immutable. However, in some
situations, her psychology is endogenous and mutable. For example, if the agent is
mentally ill (e.g. clinically depressed), and we provide her with appropriate therapy
(e.g. antidepressants), then she effectively becomes a slightly different person, with
different preferences (e.g. she may no longer wish to harm herself). Likewise, any
form of education changes a person’s knowledge, beliefs, and mental abilities, and may
also influence personality traits such as her self-discipline, self-respect, self-confidence,
open-mindedness, and respect for other people or other cultures. Different therapies
(or education systems) will lead to different post-therapeutic (or post-education) in-
dividuals.
Formally, let Ψ be the space of all possible human minds. Each human being, at
each moment in time, is described by some point ψ ∈ Ψ, which encodes her person-
ality, mood, knowledge, beliefs, values, desires, memories, mental abilities, thought
processes, and any other ethically relevant ‘psychological’ information (perhaps the
complete structure and state of her brain).11 Psychotherapy and education both in-
volve a deliberate change from some mind-state ψ1 to another mind-state ψ2. Thus,
11 Of course, it is not (yet) technologically possible to obtain such precise psychological information
about a real person. For the purposes of this paper, this is irrelevant; it is sufficient to suppose that ψ
could be defined in principle (e.g. via the precise configuration of all atoms in a person’s brain). For
practical applications, we would presumably approximate ψ with some crude psychological model,
which we hope captures most of the ethically relevant information.
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choice over psychotherapeutic or educational alternatives necessarily involves compar-
ing the welfares of ψ1, ψ2, and other elements of Ψ. However, ψ1 and ψ2 are different
people. The issue of interpersonal comparisons of well-being is precisely the question
of how (or even if) we can compare the well-being of ψ1 with that of ψ2. Thus, in-
terpersonal comparisons are necessarily implicated whenever we must choose amongst
two or more psychotherapeutic or educational alternatives.
Intertemporal comparisons. Further evidence that people have at least some limited
faculty for interpersonal comparisons is the fact that people remember their pasts
and choose their futures. Define a relation (;) on Ψ, where ψ1 ; ψ2 means “ψ2
is a possible future self of ψ1”. Equivalently: ψ2 remembers being ψ1 at some point
during her past, and ψ1 anticipates possibly becoming ψ2 at some point during her
future. Let F(ψ) := {ψ′ ∈ Ψ ; ψ ; ψ′} be ψ’s set of possible future selves, and let
P(ψ) := {ψ′ ∈ Ψ ; ψ′ ; ψ} be ψ’s set of possible12 past selves. If ψ has accurate
memory of her own past emotions, she can correctly make judgements of the form, “I
enjoy playing piano now more than I did as a teenager”, or “I became happier after
I quit that job”. This means that she can make interpersonal comparisons between
elements of P(ψ). On the other hand, to make optimal intertemporal choices, she
must choose between various possible futures, perhaps involving different future selves;
she therefore must make accurate comparisons between elements of F(ψ). This is
especially clear in intertemporal wealth transfer: we save (borrow) money because
we believe our future self will derive more (less) utility from it than our present
self —this is an interpersonal comparison. Likewise, a person choosing whether to
get an education, try a new experience, avoid ‘temptation’, undergo psychotherapy,
meditate in search of ‘inner peace’, or take a psychoactive drug (especially an addictive
one) is clearly choosing amongst possible ‘future selves’ in F(ψ). Also, the idea that
people can be held partly ‘responsible’ for their preferences (e.g. for deliberately
cultivating ‘expensive tastes’, for maintaining a more or less ‘cheerful’ disposition, or
for immiserating themselves with unrealistic life-goals) implicitly presupposes some
ability to choose over F(ψ). Finally, people often exhibit ‘metapreferences’ over their
preferences (e.g. ‘I wish I could enjoy improvisational jazz music’ or ‘I wish I wasn’t
addicted to cigarettes’) or ‘intrapersonal’ preferences (‘I wish I could become less
anxious’); these can only be understood as preferences over F(ψ). However, once we
recognize that people routinely make interpersonal comparisons across P(ξ)∪F(ξ), it
seems plausible that they can make interpersonal comparisons involving at least some
other elements of Ψ.
Actions which transform the psychologies of individuals also confront an issue
of time consistency. What if the current, pre-transformation (e.g pre-therapy or
pre-education) individual prefers the pre-transformation condition, while the antici-
pated post-transformation individual would prefer the post-transformation condition?
Should the choice of transformations (e.g. therapies or educations) be made using the
12Whether we regard elements of P(ψ) as ‘possible’ past selves or as ‘actual’ past selves depends on
the accuracy we ascribe to human memory, and also on the level of detail we encode in the variable
ψ.
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pre-transformation preferences, or using the anticipated post-transformation prefer-
ences? The answer is: neither. Instead, to decide which transformation (if any) to
perform, we must directly compare the well-being of the pre-transformation individ-
ual to the anticipated well-being of the post-transformation individual, and determine
which person is actually happier. In fact, as individuals we make such ‘intertemporal
comparisons’ all the time, whenever we decide upon some ‘self-transforming’ act.13
Psychophysical preferences. Let Φ be a space of personal ‘physical states’. Each φ ∈
Φ encodes the person’s current health, wealth, physical location, consumption bundle,
and/or any other information that is deemed ethically relevant. In most economic
models, each person has some (complete) preference order (or utility function) over
Φ. The precise structure of this preference order is determined by her psychology —in
other words, each ψ ∈ Ψ defines some preorder14 (
ψ
) over Φ. In the standard model,
ψ is fixed for each person.
However, the previous observations suggest that this model should be modified in
at least three ways. First, it may not always be appropriate to interpret (
ψ
) as a
preference order, because different theories of justice single out different conceptions
of welfare as being ethically relevant. A hedonist would want (
ψ
) to order physical
states by the amount of happiness or pleasure they generate for ψ (which may or may
not correspond to ψ’s actual preferences). At the opposite extreme, an ‘anti-welfarist’
would want (
ψ
) to order physical states according to some bundle of non-welfarist
criteria such as liberty, autonomy, or capabilities. Even ‘preferencists’ disagree as to
whether (
ψ
) should encode ψ’s ‘revealed’ preferences, her ‘omniscient’ preferences,
her ‘laundered’ preferences, or some other variant. Alternately, a ‘hybrid’ ethical
theory might want (
ψ
) to reflect some combination of all of these interpretations.
The model in this paper is abstract enough to admit any of these interpretations.
Second, (
ψ
) may not be a complete15 preorder over Φ. If we interpret (
ψ
) as a
preference order, this may simply represent ambivalence or incomplete information.
(For example, if I have never consumed either yak milk or camel milk, then I may
honestly have no opinion about which one I would prefer.) On the other hand,
suppose (
ψ
) encodes some ‘multi-objective’ conception of well-being, such as Sen’s
(1985, 1988) ‘functionings’. There is still no consensus on the best way to define a
complete ordering over bundles of functionings. If physical state φ1 dominates the φ2
in every functioning, then it seems unambiguous that φ1 ≻ φ2. However, if each of φ1
and φ2 is superior to the other in some functionings, then we may simply regard them
13Gibbard (1986, sections IV and VI) makes an argument broadly similar to some of the ideas in
the last four paragraphs.
14Let X be a set. A preorder on X is a binary relation () which is transitive (x  y  z =⇒ x  z)
and reflexive (x  x), but not necessarily complete or antisymmetric. The symmetric factor of () is
the relation (≈) defined by (x ≈ x′) ⇔ (x  x′ and x′  x). The antisymmetric factor of () is the
relation (≺) defined by (x ≺ x′) ⇔ (x  x′ and x′ 6 x). If neither x  x′ nor x′  x holds, then x
and x′ are incomparable; we then write x≻6≺x′.
15A preorder () on a set X is complete if, for all x, y ∈ X , either x  y or y  x.
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as incomparable.
Third, and most important, ψ is not a constant —it is a variable, and people exhibit
preferences over (or compare the welfare of) different elements of Ψ, in addition to
their preferences over Φ. Thus, it is more appropriate to view (
ψ
) as an (incomplete)
preorder over the Cartesian product Ψ×Φ. A person’s current psychophysical state is
an ordered pair (ψ, φ) ∈ Ψ × Φ.16 If (ψ, φ)
ψ
(ψ′, φ′), this means that a person with
psychological type ψ would prefer (or believes she would get more pleasure from, or
would have higher welfare in) the psychophysical state (ψ′, φ′) rather than her current
state (ψ, φ). Once we regard (
ψ
) as an order on Ψ× Φ, there is an additional, very
powerful reason to allow (
ψ
) to be incomplete: not all interpersonal comparisons are
possible. As I have argued above, it may be easy to compare the well-being of (ψ, φ)
and (ψ′, φ′) if the physical states φ and φ′ are sufficiently different (e.g. one involves
extreme physical distress and the other does not) or if ψ and ψ′ are sufficiently similar
(e.g. they represent two ‘possible future selves’ of the same person). However, if ψ and
ψ′ are disparate, while φ and φ′ are roughly equal, we may have neither (ψ, φ)
ψ
(ψ′, φ′)
nor (ψ, φ)
ψ
(ψ′, φ′).
Note that part of the ‘physical state’ encoded by each φ ∈ Φ is sense-data, which
in particular encodes the person’s perception of other people. Thus, (
ψ
) can encode
‘other-regarding’ preferences such as altruism, empathy, envy, spite, etc. Also, part
of the ‘psychological state’ encoded by ψ is the person’s memory of how the current
state came to be. Thus, (
ψ
) can also be sensitive to the procedure or individual
actions which led to the current state (i.e. what Sen (1985a) calls a ‘comprehensive
outcome’).
Interpersonal preorders. We have established that people’s preferences or subjective
welfare comparisons can be encoded by a collection of (incomplete) preorders (
ψ
)
defined on Ψ × Φ for every ψ ∈ Ψ. The key ontological premise of this paper is that
the dataset {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ reflects some underlying (incomplete) preorder ( ) on Ψ × Φ,
which we call an interpersonal preorder. The relation (ψ1, φ1)  (ψ2, φ2) means that it
is objectively better to be in psychophysical state (ψ1, φ1) than in psychophysical state
(ψ2, φ2) (where ‘better’ could mean ‘preferable’, ‘happier’, ‘more satisfying’, ‘of higher
capability level’, etc., depending on the conception of well-being which we adopt). To
be useful, ( ) should satisfy two axioms:
16A strict ‘materialist’, who identifies the mind with the brain, will object that this model pre-
supposes an objective distinction between a person’s ‘mental’ state ψ and her ‘physical’ state φ —a
distinction which is untenable, because mental states are physical states. However, strict materialism
commits one to an even more radical embrace of interpersonal comparisons. For the materialist, it is
impossible to separate changes in physical state from changes in psychological state, so all personal
choices (e.g. what to eat for dinner) potentially involve ‘interpersonal’ comparisons. This approach
is adopted in Pivato (2010a,b,c).
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(IP1) (Nonpaternalism) For any ψ ∈ Ψ, and all φ1, φ2 ∈ Φ,(
(ψ, φ1)  (ψ, φ2)
)
⇐⇒
(
(ψ, φ1)
ψ
(ψ, φ2)
)
and
(
(ψ, φ1) ≻ (ψ, φ2)
)
⇐⇒
(
(ψ, φ1)≻
ψ
(ψ, φ2)
)
.
(IP2) (Minimal interpersonal comparability) For all ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Ψ, and all φ1 ∈ Φ, there
exists some φ2 ∈ Φ such that (ψ1, φ1)  (ψ2, φ2), and there exists some φ
′
2 ∈ Φ
such that (ψ2, φ
′
2)  (ψ1, φ1).
Note that axiom (IP1) only requires ( ) to agree with (
ψ
) when comparing two
physical states coupled with the same psychological state ψ. It may not be appropriate
to require ( ) to agree with (
ψ
) when comparing other psychological states, because
the (subjective) preorder (
ψ
) may be wrong about the comparative well-being (or
happiness, or preferability) of other psychological states (especially those which are
disparate from ψ itself). However, we assume that (
ψ
) is always correct about the
well-being (or happiness, or preferability) of different elements {ψ} × Φ.
Thus, the statement “(ψ1, φ1) ≻ (ψ2, φ2)” does not represent someone’s subjec-
tive opinion that psychophysical state (ψ1, φ1) is better than state (ψ2, φ2) —it is
not the ‘extended sympathy’ of some hypothetical individual, so that some people
may think (ψ1, φ1) ≻ (ψ2, φ2) while others argue that (ψ1, φ1) ≺ (ψ2, φ2). Instead,
“(ψ1, φ1) ≻ (ψ2, φ2)” means that it is an objective fact that (ψ1, φ1) is better than
(ψ2, φ2). (A ‘preferencist’ could interpret () as the hypothetical preferences of a
‘universal human’, who could choose to take on any psychophysical state in Ψ × Φ
—even though actual humans do not have this freedom.) It may seem as though we
are ‘cheating’ by assuming away the heterogeneity of preferences which necessitates
social choice theory in the first place. But recall that an element ψ ∈ Ψ encodes
all the psychological information which defines someone’s identity —in particular, all
factors which determine her preferences, her emotional response to various situations,
her ‘capacity for happiness’, etc. In short, all psychological heterogeneity is already
encoded in the space Ψ.
Axiom (IP2) just says there exists at least one physical state (possibly very ex-
treme) which is clearly better for ψ2 than the physical state φ1 is for ψ1, and one
physical state which is clearly worse for ψ2 than φ1 is for ψ1. If () was a complete
ordering on Ψ×Φ, we would have a complete system of interpersonal utility level com-
parisons —in this case ( ) is very similar to an extended preference order.17 However,
we will presume that ( ) is normally quite incomplete.
The incompleteness of () can be interpreted either ‘epistemologically’ or ‘meta-
physically’.18 In the epistemological interpretation, we suppose there is, in reality,
17See e.g. Arrow (1963, 1977), Suppes (1966), (Sen, 1970b, §9*1, p.152), and (Harsanyi, 1977, §4.2,
p.53).
18Sen makes a similar distinction between tentative incompleteness and assertive incompleteness;
see (Sen, 1992, pp.46-49), (Sen, 1997, §5) or (Sen, 2004, §7).
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an underlying complete order (
∗
) on Ψ × Φ, which extends and refines (), and
which describes the ‘true’ interpersonal comparison of well-being between different
psychophysical states. However, (
∗
) is unknown to us (and perhaps, unknowable).
The partial preorder () reflects our incomplete knowledge of (
∗
).
In the metaphysical interpretation, there is no underlying true, complete ordering
of Ψ×Φ; if ψ1 6= ψ2, then it is only meaningful to compare (ψ1, φ1) and (ψ2, φ2) when
they yield unambiguously different levels of well-being (e.g. because φ1 is a state of
great suffering and φ2 is a state of great happiness). The partial preorder () encodes
all the interpersonal comparisons which can be meaningfully made between different
psychological types. If (ψ1, φ1)≻6≺ (ψ2, φ2), then it is simply meaningless to inquire
which of (ψ1, φ1) or (ψ2, φ2) experiences a greater level of well-being.
A physics analogy may clarify this distinction. Suppose Ψ represents spatial po-
sition, and Φ represents some time measurement, so that an ordered pair (ψ, φ)
represents an event which occurred at position ψ at time φ. Suppose the relation
“(ψ1, φ1)  (ψ2, φ2)” means: “The event (ψ1, φ1) happened before the event (ψ2, φ2)”.
In the epistemological interpretation, the comparison between φ1 and φ2 is subject
to some ‘measurement error’, which may depend on the distance from ψ1 to ψ2
(say, because it is difficult to determine the exact time of occurrence of far away
events). This measurement error might make it impossible for us to determine whether
(ψ1, φ1)  (ψ2, φ2) or (ψ2, φ2)  (ψ1, φ1) —but in the setting of classical physics, one
of these two statements is definitely true. However, in the setting of special relativity,
if (ψ2, φ2) occurs outside of the ‘light cone’ of (ψ1, φ1), then neither statement is true;
event (ψ2, φ2) occurred neither before nor after (ψ1, φ1). Indeed, the words ‘before’
and ‘after’ only have meaning for events which occur inside one another’s light cones.
2 Approximate interpersonal comparisons of utility
Suppose that Φ = R; that is, each person’s physical state can be entirely described
by a single real number (measuring her ‘well-being’ or ‘utility’). For all ψ ∈ Ψ, we
suppose that (
ψ
) is the standard linear ordering on R; however, different individuals
potentially have different ‘utility scales’, so given (ψ1, r1), (ψ2, r2) ∈ Ψ × R, it is not
necessarily possible to compare (ψ1, r1) and (ψ2, r2) if ψ1 6= ψ2. An interpersonal
preorder on Ψ× R thus encodes approximate interpersonal comparisons of utility.
Example 2.1 Let d be a metric on Ψ (measuring the ‘psychological distance’ between
individuals).
(a) Suppose all individuals have cardinal utility functions with the same scale (so
for any ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ψ and r1 < r2 ∈ R, the change from (ψ, r1) to (ψ, r2) represents the
same ‘increase in happiness’ for ψ as the change from (ψ′, r1) to (ψ
′, r2) represents
for ψ′). However, suppose the ‘zeros’ of different people’s utility functions are set
at different locations (so (ψ, 0) is not necessarily equivalent to (ψ′, 0)). The precise
deviation between the utility zeros of two individuals is unknown, but it is bounded
by the psychological distance between them. Formally, let c > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1] be
10
RΨ
(ψ2,r2)
(ψ1,r1)
{(ψ,r)    Ψ x R  ;  (ψ,r) > (ψ1,r1)}∋ {(ψ,r)     Ψ x R ;  (ψ,r) > (ψ2,r2)}∋
{(ψ,r)    Ψ x R ;  (ψ,r) < (ψ1,r1)}∋ {(ψ,r)     Ψ x R ;  (ψ,r) < (ψ2,r2)}
∋
R
Ψ
(ψ1,r1)
(ψ2,r2)
(a) (b)
R
Ψ
(ψ1,r1)
(c)
(ψ2,r2)
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D
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B B
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0
Figure 1: Upper and lower contour sets for the interpersonal preorders on Ψ × R from Example
2.1. Here, for visualization purposes, we suppose that Ψ ⊆ R, with the Euclidean metric. (a)
The interpersonal preorder from Example 2.1(a), with γ = 1/2. The contour sets are bounded by
curves of the form r = ±c
√
|ψ|. (b) The interpersonal preorder from Example 2.1(a), with γ = 1.
The contour sets are bounded by lines with slope ±c. Note that we must have γ ≤ 1 so that, if
(ψ1, r1)  (ψ2, r2), then the upper contour set of (ψ2, r2) is contained in the upper contour set of
(ψ1, r1) (as required by transitivity). (c) The interpersonal preorder from Example 2.1(b). The
contour sets are bounded by exponential curves of the form y = c±x.
constants. For any (ψ1, r1), (ψ2, r2) ∈ Ψ × R, stipulate that (ψ1, r1) ≺ (ψ2, r2) if and
only if r1 + c · d(ψ1, ψ2)
γ < r2, while (ψ1, r1)≈(ψ2, r2) if and only if (ψ1, r1) = (ψ2, r2).
See Figure 1(a,b).
(b) Suppose all individuals have cardinal utility functions with the same zero point
(so for all ψ, ψ′, the point (ψ, 0) is equivalent to (ψ′, 0) —perhaps being the utility of
some ‘neutral’ state, like nonexistence or eternal unconsciousness). However, different
utility functions have different scales. The precise deviation between utility scales
of two individuals is unknown, but it is bounded by psychological distance between
them. Formally, let c > 1 be a constant. For any (ψ1, r1), (ψ2, r2) ∈ Ψ× R, stipulate
that (ψ1, r1) ≺ (ψ2, r2) if and only if either r1 ≥ 0 and c
d(ψ1,ψ2) · r1 < r2, or r1 < 0 and
c−d(ψ1,ψ2) · r1 < r2. Meanwhile, (ψ1, r1)≈(ψ2, r2) if and only if either (ψ1, r1) = (ψ2, r2)
or r1 = 0 = r2. See Figure 1(c). ♦
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3 Multiutility representations
Let X be a set, and let () be a preorder on X . A utility function (or Richter-Peleg
function) for () is a function u : X−→R such that, for all x, y ∈ X ,(
x  y
)
=⇒
(
u(x) ≥ u(y)
)
(1)
and
(
x ≻ y
)
=⇒
(
u(x) > u(y)
)
. (2)
Under mild hypotheses, preorders on topological spaces admit continuous utility func-
tions (Richter, 1966; Peleg, 1970) or semicontinuous utility functions (Jaffray, 1975;
Sondermann, 1980).19 If a preorder on a space of lotteries satisfies versions of the
vNM axioms of ‘Linearity’ and ‘Continuity’, then it has a linear utility function (Au-
mann, 1962). Pivato (2010a,§6) uses the utility functions of ( ) to define a class of
‘metric’ social welfare orders, and shows that the ‘approximate maximin’ preorder is
‘maximally decisive’ within this class.
A multiutility representation for () is a set U of utility functions for () such that
for all x, y ∈ X , (
x  y
)
⇐⇒
(
u(x) ≥ u(y), for all u ∈ U
)
. (3)
Preorders admit such representations under fairly mild hypotheses. For example,
suppose () is separable, meaning there is a countable subset Y ⊆ X which is dense
(i.e. for all x ≺ z ∈ X , there exists some y ∈ Y such that x ≺ y ≺ z); then () has
a multiutility representation (Mandler, 2006, Thm.1). Furthermore, if X is a locally
compact separable metric space and () is a continuous preorder, then () admits a
multiutility representation comprised entirely of continuous utility functions (Evren
and Ok, 2009, Corollary 1).20 If we eschew topological requirements, then it is easier
to obtain a multiutility representation:
Theorem 3.1 If there exists any function u : X−→R satisfying statements (1) and
(2), then the preorder ( ) admits a multiutility representation (3).
19See also Levin (1983a,b, 1984, 2000), Mehta (1986), Herden (1989a,b,c, 1995), and the mono-
graphs by Nachbin (1965) and Bridges and Mehta (1995).
20Mandler’s (2006) result is formulated in terms of a weak multiutility representation, where the
elements of U satisfy (1) but not necessarily (2); however an examination of his proof reveals that
it actually establishes a multiutility representation in the sense defined here. Ok (2002) and Evren
and Ok (2009) have also constructed multiutility representations for topological preorders using
semicontinuous utility functions, as well as sufficient conditions for the set U in (3) to be finite; see
also Yılmaz (2008). Evren and Ok (2009) have also established the existence of (semi)continuous
weak multiutility representations for topological preorders. Much earlier, Dushnik and Miller (1941)
showed that any irreflexive partial order was the intersection of all its linear extensions; this result
was extended to preorders by Donaldson and Weymark (1998), and to a very broad class of binary
relations by Duggan (1999). However, the linear extensions involved in these intersections cannot
generally be represented by utility functions. Finally, Stecher (2008, Thm.2) provides conditions
under which a strict partial order (≺) on a set X can be represented by an ‘interval-valued’ utility
function. This means there is a collection U of Q-valued utility functions such that, for all x, y ∈ X ,
if x ≺ y, then u(x) < v(y) for all u, v ∈ U (but the converse might not hold).
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It is easy to imagine how an interpersonal preorder on Ψ×Φ could have a multiutil-
ity representation. For example, suppose there was a scientific instrument which, when
applied to any person, could objectively measure her current happiness or well-being
in some standard units. Call this hypothetical instrument a hedometer, and represent
it as a function h : Ψ × Φ−→R. We can use h to make interpersonal comparisons:
if h(ψ, φ) < h(ψ′, φ′), then, objectively, psychology ψ′ has higher welfare in physical
state φ′ than psychology ψ has in state φ.
Unfortunately, no such instrument exists, and even we had a putative hedometer
in front of us, there would be no way of verifying its accuracy. However, suppose we
have a collection of possible hedometers, in the form of a set U of utility functions for
( ).21 Perhaps some sum of increasing transformations of the elements of U is the
‘true’ hedometer, but we don’t know which one. Thus, we could define an interpersonal
preorder ( ) by statement (3).
Another way to obtain a multiutility representation is to select a jury J , and
assume each j ∈ J possesses a complete preorder (
j
) on Ψ× Φ, which expresses j’s
own (subjective) interpersonal comparisons of well-being. The orders {
j
}j∈J may
disagree with one another (although all of them must satisfy axiom (IP1)). Let (
J
)
be the intersection of the collection {
j
}j∈J ; then it is easy to check that (
J
) is an
interpersonal preorder.22 Suppose each of the preorders (
j
) can be represented by a
utility function uj : Ψ × Φ−→R. Then the set U := {uj}j∈J provides a multiutility
representation (3) for the interpersonal preorder (
J
).
For another example, suppose we measure well-being in terms of ‘capabilities’, as
advocated by Sen (1985b, 1988). So, let F be some space of ‘functioning bundles’
(e.g. F = RN , where each of the N dimensions measures some particular kind of
doing or being), and let Φ be a sigma-algebra of subsets of F . An element of Φ is
a capability: it represents a set of potential functionings which could be available to
some person. Bigger capability sets are better; they offer more personal freedom and
more opportunity for personal flourishing. Clearly, if φ1 ⊇ φ2, then capability φ1 is
better than φ2. But if neither φ1 nor φ2 contains the other, then it is hard to say
which is bigger or better. In particular, different people may prefer different forms of
freedom, and hence rank capabilities differently.
The obvious way to compare the ‘sizes’ of two subsets of F is with a measure. But
there may not be one unique measure on F which adequately expresses the capability
21This is not so far-fetched. For example, blood concentrations of certain neurochemicals and
hormones (e.g. endorphin, dopamine, serotonin, oxytocin) are correlated with feelings of happiness,
relaxation, security, and well-being, whereas the concentrations of other hormones (e.g. cortisone,
adrenaline) are correlated with stress and anxiety. These concentrations, combined with other bio-
metrics (e.g. measures of physical health), could provide a crude set of ‘hedometers’.
22Note that we must require unanimous consensus in the definition of (
J
); if we merely required
majoritarian or supermajoritarian support [e.g. we say (ψ1, φ1)
J
(ψ2, φ2) if at least 66% of all j ∈ J
think (ψ1, φ1)
j
(ψ2, φ2)], then the relation (
J
) could have cycles.
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preferences of all psychological types, or even of any single psychological type. So,
let U be a collection of real-valued functions on Ψ × Φ with the following property:
for each u ∈ U and each ψ ∈ Ψ, if we define uψ : Φ−→R by uψ(φ) := u(ψ, φ), then
uψ is a measure on Φ. If we define an interpersonal preorder ( ) by multiutility
representation (3), then we have an interpersonal comparison of capabilities.
4 Technical aside
Sections 5-8 require a few technical preliminaries. Let X be a set, and let (
1
)
and (
2
) be preorders on X . We say (
2
) extends (
1
) if, for any x, y ∈ X , we have
(x
1
y) =⇒ (x
2
y).
Now let {
j
}j∈J be a set of preorders on X (where J is some indexing set). The
join of {
j
}j∈J is the transitive closure ( ) of the union of the relations {
j
}j∈J .
That is: for any x, z ∈ X , we have x z if and only if there exists a chain x =
y0
j1
y1
j2
y2
j3
· · · 
jN
yN = z for some y1, . . . , yN−1 ∈ X and j1, . . . , jN ∈ J . Clearly,
( ) is itself a preorder which extends every (
j
). However, given x, y ∈ X and j ∈ J ,
we do not necessarily have (x≻
j
y) =⇒ (x≻ y) (because the transitive closure resolves
‘preference cycles’ into indifferences).
For every ψ ∈ Ψ, recall from §1 that (
ψ
) is a preorder on Ψ × Φ, reflecting the
preferences (or welfare-judgements) of a ψ-type personality. Axiom (IP1) says these
preferences are reliable when restricted to {ψ} × Φ. For any φ1, φ2 ∈ Φ, we will
sometimes write “φ1
ψ
φ2” to mean (ψ, φ1)
ψ
(ψ, φ2).
Recall that (
ψ
) may be incomplete, even when restricted to {ψ} × Φ. We say
that (
ψ
) is a quasi-lattice if, for any φ1, φ2 ∈ Φ, there exists φ
′, φ′′ ∈ Φ such that
φ′
ψ
φ1
ψ
φ′′ and φ′
ψ
φ2
ψ
φ′′ (in other words, the set {φ1, φ2} admits upper and lower
bounds). For example, if (Φ, 
ψ
) has a global maximum and minimum, then it is a
quasi-lattice. Also, any lattice is a quasi-lattice. In particular, any complete preorder
is a quasi-lattice.
5 Nonexample: Interpersonal preorders based on multiple desiderata
One obvious strategy for defining an interpersonal preorder fails. Let q : Φ−→RK
be some function, such that, for all k ∈ [1...K], the component qk : Φ−→R is some
quantitative measure of ‘quality of life’. For example, some of the coordinates of q
might be the consumption levels of various physical goods; others might be various
measures of physical health, or welfare indicators such as education or participation
in the social, cultural and political life of the community; others might try to measure
more intangible desiderata such as security, dignity or liberty. Define preorder (
q
)
14
on Ψ× Φ by(
(ψ, φ)
q
(ψ′, φ′)
)
⇐⇒
(
qk(φ) ≤ qk(φ
′) for every k ∈ [1...K]
)
.
Suppose the collection {q1, . . . , qK} is comprehensive enough that, for any ψ ∈ Ψ, and
any φ, φ′ ∈ Φ, if (ψ, φ)
q
(ψ, φ′), then φ
ψ
φ′ (but not conversely). Thus, if we define
(
∗
) to be the join of (
q
) and the collection {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ, then we would expect (
∗
)
to be an interpersonal preorder. However, Pattanaik and Xu (2007; §3, Proposition
1) have shown that this is false, as long as different individuals have even slightly
different preferences over Φ (a principle they call ‘minimal relativism’). The problem
is that the definition of (
q
) clearly forces (ψ, φ)≈
q
(ψ′, φ′) (and hence, (ψ, φ)≈
∗
(ψ′, φ′)),
whenever q(φ) = q(φ′). This is in fact a very strong assumption of interpersonal
preference comparison, and leaves individuals with essentially no room to differ in
their preference orderings.
To illustrate the problem, suppose K = 2, let φ1, φ2 ∈ Φ, and suppose q(φ1) =
(1, 2), while q(φ2) = (2, 1); thus, neither φ1≺
q
φ2 nor φ2≺
q
φ1. Let ψ, ψ
′ ∈ Ψ, and
suppose φ1≺
ψ
φ2 while φ2≺
ψ′
φ1. Suppose we can find some φ
′
1 very ‘close’ to φ1 such
that q(φ′1) is close to (1, 2) but dominates it; say q(φ
′
1) = (1.01, 2.01). Thus, φ1≺
q
φ′1,
but assuming ψ has continuous preferences, we have φ′1≺ψ φ2. Next, find some φ
′
2 very
‘close’ to φ2, such that q(φ
′
2) is close to (2, 1) but dominates it; say q(φ
′
2) = (2.01, 1.01).
Thus, φ2≺
q
φ′2, but assuming ψ
′ has continuous preferences, we have φ′2≺ψ′ φ1. Putting
it all together, we get φ1≺
q
φ′1≺ψ φ2≺q φ
′
2
≺
ψ′
φ1, and thus, φ1≈
∗
φ2 (because (
∗
) is the
join of (
q
), (
ψ
) and (
ψ′
)). But then (
∗
) violates axiom (IP1), because φ1≺
ψ
φ2.
6 Interpersonal preorders based on envy and pity
Suppose that each individual can attempt interpersonal comparisons between her-
self and other people, but not between two other people. Formally, for each ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Ψ,
let ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) be an interpersonal preorder on {ψ1, ψ2} × Φ which agrees with (
ψ1
) on
{ψ1} × Φ, and agrees with (
ψ2
) on {ψ2} × Φ. The order ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) is a ψ1-type per-
son’s comparison between herself and a ψ2-type person; if (ψ1, φ1) ≺
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2), then
we might say that ψ1 ‘envies’ ψ2; whereas if (ψ1, φ1) ≻
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2), then we might say
that ψ1 ‘pities’ ψ2. ‘Self-knowledge’ requires ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) to agree with (
ψ1
), while ‘nonpa-
ternalism’ requires ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) to agree with (
ψ2
).
These interpersonal comparisons might not be correct; for example, ψ1 might envy
ψ2, while ψ2 simultaneously envies ψ1 (i.e. we might have (ψ1, φ1) ≺
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2) while
(ψ2, φ2) ≺
ψ2,ψ1
(ψ1, φ1)). However, if both ψ1 and ψ2 agree that ψ1 is happier, we might
take this to mean that ψ1 objectively is happier than ψ2. In other words, we could
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define a relation (
&
) on Ψ× Φ by(
(ψ1, φ1)
&
(ψ2, φ2)
)
⇐⇒
(
(ψ1, φ1) 
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2) and (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ2,ψ1
(ψ2, φ2)
)
. (4)
Unfortunately, the relation (
&
) defined by (4) might not be an interpersonal preorder,
because it might violate either transitivity or condition (IP1).
Example 6.1 Ψ = {0, 1, 2}, let Φ = Z, and suppose (
ψ
) is the standard order-
ing on Z for each ψ ∈ Ψ. Suppose that each ψ ∈ Ψ believes that (ψ − 1, φ +
1) ≺
ψ,ψ−1
(ψ, φ) ≺
ψ,ψ+1
(ψ + 1, φ − 1), for all φ ∈ Z (here, we perform addition in Ψ mod
3, so that 2 + 1 ≡ 0 mod 3, etc.). Thus, for all ψ ∈ Ψ, if ψ′ = ψ + 1 mod 3, then
the orderings ( 
ψ,ψ′
) and ( 
ψ′,ψ
) agree on {ψ, ψ′} × Φ, so definition (4) is in force.
But (0, 9)
&
(1, 8)
&
(2, 7)
&
(0, 6). Transitivity yields (0, 9)
&
(0, 6), contradicting (IP1),
because 9≻
0
6. ♦
The system of envy/pity relations { 
ψ1,ψ2
}ψ1,ψ2∈Ψ is consistent if the following holds:
for any (ψ1, φ1), (ψ2, φ2) ∈ Ψ×Φ with (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2) and (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ2,ψ1
(ψ2, φ2), and
any (ψ′, φ′) ∈ Ψ× Φ:
• if (ψ′, φ′) 
ψ′,ψ1
(ψ1, φ1), then also (ψ
′, φ′) 
ψ′,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2);
• if (ψ′, φ′) 
ψ′,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2), then also (ψ
′, φ′) 
ψ′,ψ1
(ψ1, φ1).
This weak transitivity condition requires ψ′ to respect any {ψ1, ψ2}-interpersonal com-
parisons on which both ψ1 and ψ2 agree. For example, if both ψ1 and ψ2 think that
ψ2 is happier than ψ1, and ψ
′ envies ψ1, then she must also envy ψ2. (However, if ψ1
and ψ2 disagree about their comparative levels of well-being, then ψ
′ is not obliged to
be consistent with either of them).
Theorem 6.2 For all ψ ∈ Ψ, suppose (
ψ
) is a quasi-lattice on Φ. For any ψ1, ψ2 ∈
Ψ, let ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) be an interpersonal preorder on {ψ1, ψ2}×Φ. If the system { 
ψ1,ψ2
}ψ1,ψ2∈Ψ
is consistent, then (
&
) is an interpersonal preorder on Ψ× Φ.
7 Interpersonal preorders from local expertise
Ortun˜o-Ortin and Roemer (1991) proposed a model of interpersonal comparisons
based on ‘local expertise’. For each ψ ∈ Ψ, let Nψ ⊂ Ψ be a ‘neighbourhood’ of the
point ψ, and assume that a ψ-type individual is capable of constructing a ‘local’ inter-
personal preorder (
ψ
) over Nψ ×Φ. We can justify ψ’s ability to make interpersonal
comparisons of well-being over Nψ × Φ in at least two ways:
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• Each psychology ν ∈ Nψ is so ‘psychologically similar’ to ψ that a ψ-person can
completely empathize with a ν-person, and accurately compare of their levels of
well-being.
• N = P(ψ) ∪ F(ψ), where P(ψ) and F(ψ) are the past and possible future
psychologies of type ψ. As argued in §1, ψ must be able to make interpersonal
comparisons over P(ψ) and F(ψ), because she remembers her past and can make
choices about her future.
We need the system {Nψ, 
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ to satisfy the following consistency condition:
(RO) If Nψ1 ∩ Nψ2 6= ∅, then the local interpersonal preorders (
ψ1
) and (
ψ2
) agree
on (Nψ1 ∩Nψ2)× Φ.
(This condition is quite natural if we suppose that (
ψ1
) and (
ψ2
) are both fragments
of some some underlying ‘objectively true’ interpersonal comparison structure.) We
then define a global relation ( 
RO
) as the join of {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ (see §4). Unfortunately, ( 
RO
)
might not be an interpersonal preorder, because it may violate condition (IP1).
Example 7.1 Suppose Ψ = {0, 1, 2, 3}, and let Nψ := {j − 1, j, j + 1} for all ψ ∈ Ψ
(where we perform addition mod 4, so that 3 + 1 ≡ 0 mod 4, etc.). Let Φ = Z, and
suppose (
ψ
) is the standard ordering on Z for all ψ ∈ Ψ. Suppose that each ψ ∈ Ψ
believes that (ψ − 1, φ+ 1)≺
ψ
(ψ, φ)≺
ψ
(ψ + 1, φ− 1), for all φ ∈ Z. Condition (RO) is
satisfied, but (0, 9)
0
(1, 8)
1
(2, 7)
2
(3, 6)
3
(0, 5). Taking the transitive closure, we get
(0, 9)
RO
(0, 5), which contradicts (IP1) because 5≺
0
9. ♦
To guarantee (IP1), we require two further conditions. Given a neighbourhood
system N := {Nψ}ψ∈Ψ and two points ψ, ψ
′ ∈ Ψ, an N-chain from ψ to ψ′ is a
sequence ψ = ψ0, ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψN = ψ
′ such that, for all n ∈ [1...N ], ψn ∈ Nψn−1
(see Figure 2(A)). Let’s say that N chain-connects Ψ if any two points in Ψ can be
connected with an N-chain. If ψ := (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψn−1, ψn, ψn+1, · · · , ψN) is an N-chain
and ψn+1 ∈ Nψn−1 , then ψ
′ := (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψn−1, ψn+1, · · · , ψN) is also an N-chain; let’s
say that ψ′ and ψ are related by elementary homotopy, and write ψ
ǫ˜
ψ′ (see Figure
2(B)). Note that ψ and ψ′ have the same endpoints. Two N-chains ψ and ψ′ are
homotopic if ψ can be converted into ψ′ through a sequence of elementary homotopies
—that is, there is a sequence of N-chains ψ = ψ1 ǫ˜ ψ2 ǫ˜ · · · ǫ˜ ψN = ψ
′ (see Figure
2(C)). It follows that ψ and ψ′ must have the same endpoints.
The N-chain ψ is closed if ψN = ψ0. Say ψ is trivial if ψ0 = ψ1 = · · · = ψN . Say
ψ is nullhomotopic if ψ is homotopic to a trivial chain. The neighbourhood system
N := {Nψ}ψ∈Ψ is simply connected if it chain-connects Ψ, and any closed chain is
nullhomotopic.
Example 7.2 (a) Suppose Ψ is a simply connected topological space (e.g. Ψ = RN),
and for each ψ ∈ Ψ, let Nψ be a simply connected open neighbourhood of ψ (e.g. a
ball). Then the system N is simply connected.
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ψ1
ψ2
ψ3
ψ4
ψ5
ψ6
ψ7
Nψ3
Nψ6
ψ1
ψ2
ψ3 ψ4 ψ5
ψ1
ψ2
ψ4 ψ5
Nψ2 Nψ2
(A) (B)
(C)
Figure 2: (A) A chain. Here, Ψ = Z2, and for all ψ ∈ Ψ, Nψ = {ψ′ ∈ Ψ; |ψ1 − ψ′1| ≤ 1
and |ψ2 − ψ
′
2| ≤ 1}. We have shaded Nψ3 and Nψ6 to illustrate. (B) An elementary homotopy,
obtained by deleting the element ψ3 from the chain. (C) A sequence of elementary homotopies yields
a homotopy from the far-left chain to the far-right chain.
(b) Suppose Ψ = ZN , and for all ψ ∈ Ψ, let Nψ be the unit box around ψ —that is,
Nψ :=
{
ψ′ ∈ ZN ; |ψ′n − ψn| ≤ 1, ∀n ∈ [1...N ]
}
. Then N is simply connected.
(c) The system in Example 7.1 is not simply connected. For example, the sequence
(0, 1, 2, 3, 0) is a closed chain, but it is not nullhomotopic. ♦
Ortun˜o-Ortin and Roemer (1991) say that the local interpersonal preorder (
ψ
)
on Nψ is continuous if (
ψ
) is a complete preorder of {ψ} × Φ, and if, for any φ ∈ Φ
and ψ1 ∈ Nψ, there is some φ1 such that (ψ, φ)≈
ψ
(ψ1, φ1). Continuity is a very strong
property: in particular it implies that (
ψ
) is a complete ordering of Nψ × Φ. We
will work with a much weaker property. Let’s say that (
ψ
) is semicontinuous if, for
every φ ∈ Φ and (ψ1, φ1) ∈ Nψ × Φ if (ψ, φ)≺
ψ
(ψ1, φ1), then for every other ψ
′ ∈ Nψ,
there exists some φ′ ∈ Φ such that (ψ, φ)≺
ψ
(ψ′, φ′)
ψ
(ψ1, φ1), and there exists some
φ′ ∈ Φ such that (ψ, φ)
ψ
(ψ′, φ′)≺
ψ
(ψ1, φ1). In other words, we can always interpose
an element of {ψ′} × Φ between any element of {ψ} × Φ and any other element of
Nψ ×Φ. Clearly, if (
ψ
) is continuous, then it is semicontinuous (but not conversely).
The system of local interpersonal preorders {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ is consistent if each local in-
terpersonal preorder (
ψ
) can be extended to a semicontinuous interpersonal preorder
( ̂
ψ
) on Nψ×Φ, such that the system {Nψ, ̂
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ still has property (RO). For exam-
ple, {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ would be consistent if each interpersonal preorder (
ψ
) represented ψ’s
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incomplete (but accurate) perception of some underlying, objectively true system of
complete interpersonal comparisons, encoded by { ̂
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ. But it is not necessary to
assume such an ‘objectively true’ system. Indeed, the extending system { ̂
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ need
not be unique —there may be many semicontinuous extensions of {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ which sat-
isfy (RO), with none of them selected as the ‘true’ extension. Also, it is not necessary
for us to have explicit knowledge of any of these extensions —only to know that at
least one such extension exists.
Theorem 7.3 Suppose N is simply connected, and {Nψ, 
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ satisfies (RO).
(a) If the system {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ is consistent, then the global relation ( 
RO
) is an in-
terpersonal preorder on Ψ× Φ.
(b) Furthermore, if (
ψ
) is continuous for every ψ ∈ Ψ, then ( 
RO
) is a complete
interpersonal preorder on Ψ× Φ.
Ortun˜o-Ortin and Roemer (1991) prove two special cases of Theorem 7.3(b): the
case Ψ = ZN described in Example 7.2(b), and the case when Ψ = RN , where, for each
ψ ∈ RN , the neighbourhoodNψ is arc-connected and has radius at least ǫ around ψ, for
some fixed ǫ > 0. However, Theorem 7.3(b) requires indifference-connectedness, which
may be an unreasonably strong assumption even for ‘local’ interpersonal comparisons.
8 Interpersonal preorders from infinitesimal expertise
One might object that even the ‘local’ interpersonal preorders posited in §7 as-
sume an unrealistic level of interpersonal comparability. In response to this objection,
this section develops a model which posits only ‘infinitesimal’ interpersonal compar-
isons. This will require some elementary differential geometry; see Warner (1983) for
background.
Suppose Ψ and Φ are connected differentiable manifolds, and let Ψ × Φ have the
product manifold structure. For any ψ ∈ Ψ, let Tψ Ψ be the tangent space
23 of Ψ
at ψ; for any φ ∈ Φ, we similarly define the tangent spaces TφΦ and T(ψ,φ) (Ψ ×
Φ) ∼= Tψ Ψ × TφΦ. If γ : (−ǫ, ǫ)−→Φ is any smooth curve with γ(0) = φ, then let
γ′(0) ∈ TφΦ be the velocity vector of γ at 0; if ~0ψ ∈ Tψ Ψ is the zero vector, then
(~0ψ, γ
′(0)) is an element of T(ψ,φ) (Ψ× Φ). Let ~0φ be the zero vector in TφΦ, and let
~0(ψ,φ) := (~0ψ,~0φ) ∈ T(ψ,φ) (Ψ× Φ).
For every (ψ, φ) ∈ Ψ × Φ, let ( 
(ψ,φ)
) be a preorder on T(ψ,φ) (Ψ × Φ) with the
following property: If γ : (−ǫ, ǫ)−→Φ is any smooth curve with γ(0) = φ, such
that γ(−t) 
ψ
φ 
ψ
γ(t) for all t ∈ [0, ǫ), then ~0(ψ,φ) 
(ψ,φ)
(~0ψ, γ
′(0)). Intuitively, if
23A tangent vector at ψ is the velocity vector of a smooth path in Ψ as it passes through ψ. The
tangent space Tψ Ψ is the set of all tangent vectors at ψ; it is a vector space of the same dimension
as Ψ itself.
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~v ∈ T(ψ,φ) (Ψ × Φ) and ~v 
(ψ,φ)
~0(ψ,φ), then this means that infinitesimal movement
through the manifold Ψ × Φ in the ~v direction is regarded as a net improvement,
even if it involves a change of psychological state as well as physical state. In other
words, we are allowed to make ‘infinitesimal’ interpersonal comparisons of well-being:
comparisons between individuals whose psychologies are only infinitesimally different.
This yields an interpersonal preorder (
;
) on Ψ× Φ, defined as follows:
(
(ψ0, φ0)
;
(ψ1, φ1)
)
⇐⇒
(
∃ smooth path γ : [0, 1]−→Ψ× Φ with γ(0) = (ψ0, φ0),
γ(1) = (ψ1, φ1), and γ
′(t) 
γ(t)
~0γ(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1]
)
.
In other words, it is possible to move from (ψ0, φ0) to (ψ1, φ1) along a path which,
at every instant, is regarded as an ‘infinitesimal improvement’. We refer to γ as an
improvement path.
The relation (
;
) may violate (IP1) unless further conditions are imposed on the
system of order relations X = { 
(ψ,φ)
}(ψ,φ)∈Ψ×Φ. The system X is smooth if there exists
an open cover {Oj}j∈J of Ψ (for some indexing set J ), and for each j ∈ J , a smooth
function uj : Oj × Φ−→R such that:
(Sm1) For each j ∈ J , each ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Oj, we have uj ({ψ1} × Φ) = uj ({ψ2} × Φ).
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(Sm2) For each j ∈ J , each (ψ, φ) ∈ Oj × Φ, and each ~v ∈ T(ψ,φ) (Ψ × Φ), if
~v 
(ψ,φ)
~0(ψ,φ), then ∇ui(ψ, φ)[~v] ≥ 0.
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(Sm3) For any j, k ∈ J , if Oj ∩ Ok 6= ∅, then uj and uk are ‘ordinally equivalent’
on their domain overlap: for all ψ, ψ′ ∈ Oj ∩ Ok and all φ, φ
′ ∈ Φ, we have
ui(ψ, φ) ≤ ui(ψ
′, φ′) if and only if uj(ψ, φ) ≤ uj(ψ
′, φ′).
Theorem 8.1 If Ψ is simply connected and X is smooth, then (
;
) is an interpersonal
preorder.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let f : R−→(0, 1) be a strictly increasing bijection (for
example: f(x) = (tanh(x)+1)/2), and let v := f◦u. Then v also satisfies statements
(1) and (2).
For all x ∈ X , let Yx := {y ∈ X ; y  x}, and define wx : X−→R by wx(y) := 1
for all y ∈ Yx, while wx(y) := 0 for all other y ∈ X . Then define ux := v + wx.
Claim 1: ux is a utility function for ( ).
24These two sets are intervals in R, because Φ is connected and uj is a continuous function. Thus,
it is equivalent to simply require uj ({ψ1} × Φ) and uj ({ψ2} × Φ) to have the same maximum (or
supremum) and minimum (or infimum).
25∇ui(ψ, φ) is the gradient of ui at (ψ, φ) (a linear functional on T(ψ,φ) (Ψ × Φ)). The quantity
∇ui(ψ, φ)[~v] is the ‘instantaneous rate of change’ of ui when moving from (ψ, φ) in the direction ~v.
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Proof. We must check statements (1) and (2). Let y, z ∈ X . Suppose y z. Then
wx(y) ≥ wx(z) (because if z ∈ Yx, then also y ∈ Yx, by transitivity).
If y z, then v(y) ≥ v(z) because v satisfies (1). Thus, ux(y) ≥ ux(z).
If y≻ z, then v(y) > v(z) because v satisfies (2). Thus, ux(y) > ux(z). 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: Let x, y, z ∈ X . If ux(y) ≥ ux(z), then wx(y) ≥ wx(z).
Proof. (by contrapositive) Suppose wx(y) < wx(z). Then we must have wx(y) = 0
and wx(z) = 1. But v(y) < 1 and v(z) > 0, because v ranges over (0, 1) by
construction. Thus, ux(y) = wx(y) + v(y) = 0 + v(y) < 1 = wx(z) < ux(z), so
ux(y) < ux(z). 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: For any y, z ∈ X ,
(
y  z
)
⇐⇒
(
ux(y) ≥ ux(z) for all x ∈ X
)
.
Proof. “=⇒” follows from Claim 1. To see “⇐=”, suppose ux(y) ≥ ux(z) for all
x ∈ X . Then Claim 2 implies that wx(y) ≥ wx(z) for all x ∈ X . In particular,
wz(y) ≥ wz(z) = 1, so wz(y) = 1, which means y ∈ Yz, which means y  z.
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3 Claim 3
Thus, the set U := {ux ; x ∈ X} provides a multiutility representation for ( ). 2
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Clearly, (
&
) is reflexive. We must show that (
&
) is transitive
and satisfies properties (IP1) and (IP2).
Transitive. Suppose (ψ1, φ1)
&
(ψ2, φ2) and (ψ2, φ2)
&
(ψ3, φ3). We must show that
(ψ1, φ1)
&
(ψ3, φ3).
We have (ψ2, φ2) 
ψ2,ψ3
(ψ3, φ3), and (ψ2, φ2) 
ψ3,ψ2
(ψ3, φ3), while (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2),
so consistency requires that (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ1,ψ3
(ψ3, φ3).
Likewise, (ψ2, φ2) 
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ1, φ1), and (ψ2, φ2) 
ψ2,ψ1
(ψ1, φ1), while
(ψ3, φ3) 
ψ3,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2), so consistency requires that (ψ3, φ3) 
ψ3,ψ1
(ψ1, φ1).
Thus, (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ1,ψ3
(ψ3, φ3) and (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ3,ψ1
(ψ3, φ3), so (ψ1, φ1)
&
(ψ3, φ3), as de-
sired.
(IP1) Fix ψ ∈ Ψ and φ, φ′ ∈ Φ, with φ1
ψ
φ′1. By hypothesis, ( ψ,ψ ) is an interpersonal
preorder on {ψ}×Φ, so it agrees with (
ψ
). Thus, setting ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ in definition
(4), we get (
(ψ, φ)
&
(ψ, φ′)
)
⇐⇒
(
(ψ, φ) 
ψ,ψ
(ψ, φ′)
)
(5)
26The argument of the last sentence is from Proposition 1 of Evren and Ok (2009).
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By similar logic, we have
(
(ψ, φ)
&
(ψ, φ′)
)
⇐⇒
(
(ψ, φ)
ψ,ψ
(ψ, φ′)
)
Taking the con-
trapositive of statement (5) yields
(
(ψ, φ) 6
&
(ψ, φ′)
)
⇐⇒
(
(ψ, φ) 6 
ψ,ψ
(ψ, φ′)
)
.
Thus,
(
(ψ, φ)≺
&
(ψ, φ′)
)
⇐⇒
(
(ψ, φ) ≺
ψ,ψ
(ψ, φ′)
)
.
(IP2) Fix ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Ψ and φ1 ∈ Φ. The relation ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) is an interpersonal preorder,
so it satisfies (IP2), so there is some φ′2 ∈ Φ such that (ψ1, φ1) ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ
′
2). Like-
wise, ( 
ψ2,ψ1
) satisfies (IP2), so there is some φ′′2 ∈ Φ such that (ψ1, φ1) ψ2,ψ1
(ψ2, φ
′′
2).
Since (
ψ2
) is a quasi-lattice, we can find some φ2 ∈ Φ such that φ
′
ψ2
φ2 and φ
′′
ψ2
φ2.
Thus, (ψ2, φ
′) 
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2) and (ψ2, φ
′′) 
ψ2,ψ1
(ψ2, φ2) (because ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) and ( 
ψ2,ψ1
) sat-
isfy (IP1)). Thus, (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2) and (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ2,ψ1
(ψ2, φ2) (because ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) and
( 
ψ2,ψ1
) are transitive). Thus, definition (4) yields (ψ1, φ1)
&
(ψ2, φ2).
Through an identical construction, we can obtain some φ2 ∈ Φ such that
(ψ1, φ1)
&
(ψ2, φ2). This works for all ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Ψ and φ1 ∈ Φ; thus, (
&
) satis-
fies (IP2). 2
To prove Theorem 7.3 we need some technical preliminaries. A preference chain is
a sequence (ψ0, φ0)
ψ0
(ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
(ψ2, φ2)
ψ2
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN), where at least one of these
preferences is strict. Clearly, the underlying sequence ψ = (ψ0, ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψN) must
be an N-chain; in this case we say that ψ carries a preference chain between (ψ1, φ1)
and (ψN , φN).
Lemma A.1 Suppose (
ψ
) is semicontinuous for every ψ ∈ Ψ. Suppose ψ carries a
preference chain between (ψ0, φ0) and (ψN , φN). If ψ is homotopic to ψ
′, then ψ′ also
carries a preference chain between (ψ0, φ0) and (ψN , φN).
Proof. It suffices to prove this when ψ
ǫ˜
ψ′ (the general case follows by induction).
There are two cases: either the elementary homotopy removes a link from the chain,
or it adds a link.
Case 1. (Link removal) Suppose ψ := (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψn−1, ψn, ψn+1, · · · , ψN) carries
the preference chain (ψ0, φ0)
ψ0
· · · 
ψn−2
(ψn−1, φn−1) 
ψn−1
(ψn, φn)
ψn
(ψn+1, φn+1) 
ψn+1
· · ·

ψN−1
(ψN , φN). Suppose ψn+1 ∈ Nψn−1 and ψ
′ := (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψn−1, ψn+1, · · · , ψN).
Then (ψn, φn) 
ψn−1
(ψn+1, φn+1), because (ψn, φn)
ψn
(ψn+1, φn+1) and ψn, ψn+1 ∈
Nψn−1 ∩ Nψn , and (
ψn
) agrees with ( 
ψn−1
) on (Nψn−1 ∩ Nψn) × Φ by
(RO). Thus, (ψn−1, φn−1) 
ψn−1
(ψn+1, φn+1), because (ψn−1, φn−1) 
ψn−1
(ψn, φn) and
( 
ψn−1
) is transitive. Furthermore, if either (ψn−1, φn−1) ≺
ψn−1
(ψn, φn) or
(ψn, φn)≺
ψn
(ψn+1, φn+1), then (ψn−1, φn−1) ≺
ψn−1
(ψn+1, φn+1). Thus, we get a pref-
erence chain (ψ0, φ0)
ψ0
· · · 
ψn−2
(ψn−1, φn−1) 
ψn−1
(ψn+1, φn+1) 
ψn+1
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN) sup-
ported on ψ′, as desired.
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Case 2. (Link addition) Suppose ψ := (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψn−1, ψn+1, · · · , ψN) carries the pref-
erence chain
(ψ0, φ0) 
ψ0
· · · 
ψn−2
(ψn−1, φn−1) 
ψn−1
(ψn+1, φn+1) 
ψn+1
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN) (6)
(where some preference is strict).
Claim 1: ψ carries a preference chain like (6) between (ψ1, φ1) and (ψN , φN),
but such that (ψn−1, φn−1) ≺
ψn−1
(ψn+1, φn+1).
Proof. By hypothesis, the preference chain (6) contains at least one strict preference;
say (ψm, φm) ≺
ψm
(ψm+1, φm+1) for some m ∈ [1 . . . N−1]. It suffices to show that
we can ‘shift’ this strict preference backwards or forwards in the chain.
Backwards shift. Semicontinuity of ( 
ψm
) yields some φ′m ∈ Φ such that
(ψm, φm) ≺
ψm
(ψm, φ
′
m)ψm
(ψm+1, φm+1). Thus, (ψm, φm) ≺
ψm−1
(ψm, φ
′
m) (because
ψm ∈ Nψm−1 ∩ Nψm , and ( 
ψm−1
) agrees with ( 
ψm
) on (Nψm−1 ∩
Nψm) × Φ). But (ψm−1, φm−1) 
ψm−1
(ψm, φm), so transitivity of ( 
ψm−1
) yields
(ψm−1, φm−1) ≺
ψm−1
(ψm, φ
′
m).
Forwards shift. Semicontinuity of ( 
ψm
) yields some φ′m+1 ∈ Φ such that
(ψm, φm)
ψm
(ψm+1, φ
′
m+1) ≺ψm
(ψm+1, φm+1). Thus, (ψm+1, φ
′
m+1) ≺ψm+1
(ψm+1, φm+1)
(because ψm+1 ∈ Nψm ∩ Nψm+1 , and ( 
ψm+1
) agrees with ( 
ψm
) on (Nψm+1 ∩
Nψm) × Φ). But (ψm+1, φm+1) 
ψm+1
(ψm+2, φm+2), so transitivity of ( 
ψm+1
) yields
(ψm+1, φ
′
m+1) ≺ψm+1
(ψm+2, φm+2).
Now, if m > n − 1, then apply the ‘backwards shift’ (m − n + 1) times. If
m < n− 1, then apply the ‘forwards shift’ (n−m− 1) times. 3 Claim 1
Now suppose ψ′ := (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψn−1, ψn, ψn+1, · · · , ψN), for some ψn ∈ Nψn−1
such that ψn+1 ∈ Nψn . Claim 1 means that we can assume without
loss of generality that (ψn−1, φn−1) ≺
ψn−1
(ψn+1, φn+1). Semicontinuity of ( 
ψn−1
)
yields some φn ∈ Φ such that (ψn−1, φn−1) ≺
ψn−1
(ψn, φn) 
ψn−1
(ψn+1, φn+1). Thus,
(ψn, φn)
ψn
(ψn+1, φn+1) because ψn, ψn+1 ∈ Nψn−1 ∩ Nψn , and (
ψn
) agrees
with ( 
ψn−1
) on (Nn−1 ∩ Nn) × Φ by (RO). Thus, we get a preference
chain (ψ0, φ0)
ψ0
· · · 
ψn−2
(ψn−1, φn−1) ≺
ψn−1
(ψn, φn)
ψn
(ψn+1, φn+1) 
ψn+1
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN)
supported on ψ′, as desired. 2
Proof of Theorem 7.3. Let ( 
RO
) be the join of {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ. Then ( 
RO
) is a preorder on
Ψ× Φ.
(a) We must show that ( ) satisfies (IP1) and (IP2).
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(IP1) Case 1. First suppose that each local relation (
ψ
) is semicontinuous.
Let ψ1 ∈ Ψ and φ1, φ
′
1 ∈ Φ. If φ1ψ1
φ′1, then we automatically have (ψ1, φ
′
1)RO(ψ1, φ1).
Now suppose φ′1≺ψ1
φ1. To show that (ψ1, φ
′
1) ≺RO (ψ1, φ1), we must show that (ψ1, φ
′
1)
6 
RO
(ψ1, φ1).
By contradiction, suppose (ψ1, φ
′
1) RO (ψ1, φ1); then there must be a preference
chain
(ψ1, φ
′
1) ≺ψ1
(ψ1, φ1) 
ψ1
(ψ2, φ2) 
ψ2
· · · 
ψN−2
(ψN−1, φN−1) 
ψN−1
(ψ1, φ
′
1).
Let ψN := ψ0 := ψ1 and φN := φ0 := φ
′
1. Then ψ := (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψN) is a closed
N-chain carrying the preference chain ξ := [(ψ0, φ0)≺
ψ0
(ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN)].
Since Ψ is simply connected, the chainψ is homotopic to a trivial chain (ψ1, ψ1, . . . , ψ1),
and by Lemma A.1, this homotopy transforms the preference chain ξ into a prefer-
ence chain (ψ1, φ
′
1)ψ1
(ψ1, φˆ1)
ψ1
(ψ1, φˆ2)
ψ1
· · · 
ψ0
(ψ1, φˆN−1)
ψ1
(ψN , φN) = (ψ1, φ
′
1), where
at least one of these preferences is strict. Thus, transitivity of (
ψ1
) forces (ψ1, φ
′
1)≺ψ1
(ψ1, φ
′
1).
Contradiction.
By contradiction, no such preference chain can exist. Thus, (ψ1, φ
′
1) ≺RO (ψ1, φ1).
Case 2. Now let the system {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ be arbitrary. By hypothesis, we can extend
each local interpersonal preorder (
ψ
) to some semicontinuous interpersonal pre-
order ( ̂
ψ
), such that the system {Nψ, ̂
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ still satisfies axiom (RO). Let ( ̂
RO
)
be the join of { ̂
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ and let ( 
RO
) be the join of {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ; then ( ̂
RO
) extends
( 
RO
). Thus, for each ψ ∈ Ψ, the interpersonal preorder ( 
RO
) agrees with (
ψ
) on
{ψ} × Φ, because ( ̂
RO
) agrees with (
ψ
) on {ψ} × Φ, by Case 1.
(IP2) Let ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ψ and φ ∈ Φ; we must find some φ′ ∈ Φ such that (ψ, φ)
RO
(ψ′, φ′). Let
ψ = ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψN = ψ
′ be an N-chain (this exists because N chain-connects Ψ).
There exists φ1 ∈ Φ with (ψ, φ)
ψ
(ψ1, φ1), because (
ψ
) is an interpersonal preorder
on Nψ × Φ. Next, there exists φ2 ∈ Φ with (ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
(ψ2, φ2), because (
ψ1
) is an
interpersonal preorder on Nψ1 × Φ. Proceeding inductively, we obtain a preference
chain (ψ, φ)
ψ0
(ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN). Let φ
′ := φN ; then (ψ, φ)
RO
(ψ′, φ′).
A similar construction yields some φ′′ ∈ Φ such that (ψ, φ) 
RO
(ψ′, φ′′).
(b) Part (a) shows that ( 
RO
) is an interpersonal preorder. It remains only to show that
( 
RO
) is complete if each (
ψ
) is continuous.
Let (ψ, φ), (ψ′, φ′) ∈ Ψ×Φ; we must show these two points are comparable. Since
N chain-connects Ψ, there is an N-chain ψ = ψ0, ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψN = ψ
′ connecting ψ
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to ψ′. Now, for all n ∈ [0...N) the interpersonal preorder (
ψn
) is continuous, so we
can construct an indifference chain (ψ, φ) = (ψ0, φ0)≈
ψ0
(ψ1, φ1)≈
ψ1
· · · ≈
ψN−1
(ψN , φN) =
(ψ′, φN), for some φN ∈ Φ. Thus, (ψ, φ)≈
RO
(ψ′, φN). But (
ψ′
) is a complete ordering
of Φ, so either φN
ψ′
φ′ or φN 
ψ′
φ′; thus, either (ψ′, φN)
RO
(ψ′, φ′) or (ψ′, φN) 
RO
(ψ′, φ′);
thus, either (ψ, φ)
RO
(ψ′, φ′) or (ψ, φ) 
RO
(ψ′, φ′), because (ψ, φ)≈
RO
(ψ′, φN) and ( 
RO
)
is transitive by construction. 2
Proof of Theorem 8.1. For every ψ ∈ Ψ, find some j ∈ J with ψ ∈ Oj. The open set
Oj contains an open ball around ψ, and if this open ball is small enough, it is simply
connected (because Ψ is a manifold). Thus, let Nψ ⊂ Oj be some simply connected
open neighbourhood of ψ, and let uψ be the restriction of uj to Nψ×Φ. This yields
a simply connected neighbourhood system N = {Nψ}ψ∈Ψ, as in Example 7.2(a).
For every ψ ∈ Ψ, define a ‘local’ interpersonal preorder (
ψ
) on Nψ×Φ as follows:
for all (ν0, φ0), (ν1, φ1) ∈ Nψ × Φ,(
(ν0, φ0)
ψ
(ν1, φ1)
)
⇐⇒
(
∃ improvement path γ : [0, 1]−→Nψ × Φ
with γ(0) = (ν0, φ0) and γ(1) = (ν1, φ1)
)
.
Thus, (
;
) is obtained by taking the join of all the local interpersonal preorders
{
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ, exactly as in the definition of ( 
RO
) in §7. Thus, it suffices to show that
the system {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ is consistent, and then invoke Theorem 7.3(a).
Let ψ ∈ Ψ. Define ( ̂
ψ
) on Nψ ×Φ as follows: for all (ν0, φ0), (ν1, φ1) ∈ Nψ ×Φ,(
(ν0, φ0)̂
ψ
(ν1, φ1)
)
⇐⇒
(
uψ(ν0, φ0) ≤ uψ(ν1, φ1)
)
. (7)
Clearly, ( ̂
ψ
) is a complete order on Nψ × Φ. Axiom (Sm1) implies that ( ̂
ψ
) is
continuous, and thus, semicontinuous.
Claim 2: The system {Nψ, ̂
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ satisfies property (RO) from §7.
Proof. Let ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Ψ. Suppose Nψ1 ∩Nψ2 6= ∅, and the relations ( ̂
ψ1
) and ( ̂
ψ2
) are
defined by (7). Suppose uψ1 is the restriction of uj toNψ1 and uψ2 is the restriction
of uk to Nψ2 , for some j, k ∈ J . Thus, Oj ∩Ok 6= ∅ (since it contains Nψ1 ∩Nψ2),
and then property (Sm3) ensures that ( ̂
ψ1
) and ( ̂
ψ2
) agree onNψ1∩Nψ2 . 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: For any ψ ∈ Ψ, the preorder ( ̂
ψ
) extends (
ψ
).
25
Proof. Let (ν0, φ0), (ν1, φ1) ∈ Nψ × Φ, with (ν0, φ0)
ψ
(ν1, φ1); we must show that
(ν0, φ0)̂
ψ
(ν1, φ1). But if (ν0, φ0)
ψ
(ν1, φ1), then there is some improvement path
γ : [0, 1]−→Nψ × Φ with γ(0) = (ν0, φ0) and γ(1) = (ν1, φ1). Thus,
uψ(ν1, φ1) = uψ◦γ(1) (∗) uψ◦γ(0)+
∫ 1
0
(uψ◦γ)
′(t) dt ≥
(†)
uψ◦γ(0) = uψ(ν0, φ0),
so (ν0, φ0)̂
ψ
(ν1, φ1), as desired.
Here, (∗) is the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus. Inequality (†) is because
(uψ ◦ γ)
′(t)
(c)
∇uψ(γ(t))[γ
′(t)] ≥
(⋄)
0 for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Here, (c) is by the Chain
Rule, and (⋄) is by (Sm2) and the fact that γ′(t) 
γ(t)
~0γ(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1] (because
γ is an improvement path). 3 Claim 3
Thus, the system {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ is consistent, so Theorem 7.3(a) implies that (
;
) is an
interpersonal preorder. 2
Remark. In the proof of Theorem 8.1, the inequality uψ(ν0, φ0) ≤ uψ(ν1, φ1) is
necessary, but not sufficient to conclude that (ν0, φ0)
;
(ν1, φ1). Thus, assuming the
existence of a function uψ : Nψ × Φ−→R is not tantamount to assuming some ‘local’
form of ‘ordinal, fully comparable’ utility functions —it is a much weaker assumption.
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